Executive Summary
What is Credit Insurance?
Credit
insurance is big business. From 1995 to 1997, more than $17 billion of credit
insurance was sold in the United States. Credit insurance refers to a group of
insurance products sold in conjunction with a loan or credit agreement. The
products may be sold by credit card companies, auto dealers, finance companies,
department stores, furniture stores or wherever loans are made and credit
extended for the purchase of personal property. The major types of credit
insurance that are the subject of this report are:
This report reviews the performance of state
insurance regulators in protecting the consumers of credit insurance. Our
analysis shows that ineffective regulation has caused consumers to overpay for
credit insurance by $2 billion dollars a year and has failed to protect
consumers from unfair sales and market practices. Additional problems exist for
credit property insurance.
Credit Insurance Consumers Overcharged by $ 2
Billion a Year
The loss ratio – the ratio of benefits paid on behalf of
consumers to premiums paid by consumers – is the single most important measure
of the value of credit insurance to consumers. Insurance regulators have
determined that a 60% is the minimum loss ratio for credit life and credit
disability insurance to provide reasonable benefits to consumers in relation to
premium costs. The 60% loss ratio standard for credit life and disability
insurance is a modest one. Actual historical loss ratios for group life
insurance and group accident and health insurance exceed 90% and 75%,
respectively. Historical loss ratios for private passenger automobile insurance
are just under 70%.
Our review of actual credit insurance loss
ratios shows that state legislatures and/or state insurance regulators, with
only a very few exceptions, have failed to protect credit insurance consumers.
Actual historical credit insurance loss ratios are far below even the NAIC
model’s modest 60% loss ratio standard.
Table 1 shows 1997 countrywide credit insurance
premiums, loss ratios and commissions by coverage. The 1997 credit insurance
loss ratios ranged from 12% to 49%, depending upon the coverage. Overall, less
than 39 cents on the premium dollar was paid out in claims on behalf of
consumers.
Excessive Premiums Earned Loss Compensation Paid
By Premium Ratio Ratio Consumers Life $2,167,090,316 41.6% 33.3% $664,879,714 Disability $2,190,298,711 48.6% 28.5% $415,841,316 Unemployment $763,112,174 12.6% 52.6% $635,128,143 Property (FEC) $399,072,541 26.3% 32.8% $259,159,049 Property (Other) $104,072,500 11.6% 45.1% $87,986,495 Total $5,623,646,242 38.7% 34.2% $2,062,994,717
These loss ratios are unconscionably low – far
below any reasonable measure of benefit in relation to the premium charged to
consumers. The actual loss ratios fall far below even the NAIC minimum
standards. The credit involuntary unemployment and credit property loss ratios
are particularly egregious.
If credit insurance had been priced to provide
even minimum reasonable benefits to consumers in relation to premiums paid,
consumers would have paid $2 billion less in premium for credit insurance in
1997. Overall credit insurance overcharges were almost 37% of total premium
charged. For credit unemployment and credit property (other), premiums were
excessive by more than 80% of premium.
While a few states do a good overall job of
regulating credit insurance and protecting consumers – New York, Maine and
Pennsylvania – the vast majority of states fail miserably in protecting credit
insurance consumers. Table 2 shows the 1995-97 combined loss ratio for credit
life, disability, unemployment and property and the amount of premium
overcharges by state. The worst states for credit insurance consumers include
Louisiana, North Dakota, Mississippi, Alaska, Nebraska and Minnesota where
overall loss ratios were less than 32% and consumer overcharges were
around 50% or more of total premium. Forty-five states and the District
of Columbia had three-year overall credit insurance loss ratios of less than
50%. Three-year overcharges exceed $100 million in 14 states.
Reverse Competition and Ineffective
Regulation Lead to Massive Overcharges
The dominant characteristic of
credit insurance markets throughout the country is reverse competition.
The credit insurance policy is a group policy sold to a lender who then
issues certificates to individual borrowers. Because the lender purchases the
policy, credit insurers market the product to the lenders and not to the
borrower -- the ultimate consumer who pays for the product. This market
structure leads insurers to bid for the lender’s business by providing higher
commissions and other compensation to the lender. Greater competition for the
lender’s business leads to higher prices of credit insurance to the
borrower.
When states establish prima facie rates for
credit life and credit disability insurance, credit insurers are generally
allowed to charge lower rates if they want. Few credit insurers do. Because of
reverse competition, a credit insurer who wants to offer the ultimate consumer a
lower rate will simply not be able to get a lender to select the product. The
lender will select another credit insurer who, by charging a higher rate to the
ultimate consumer, can offer a higher commission to the lender.
When presumptive rates are set too high,
competition does not force credit insurers to offer lower rates in the market.
In the case of credit life and credit disability, presumptive rates have clearly
been too high to achieve the 60% target loss ratio. For credit unemployment and
credit property insurance, there are typically no presumptive rates and state
regulators have shown dismal performance in protecting consumers from excessive
rates caused by reverse competition.
In the cases of credit property and credit
unemployment coverages, commissions to lenders are as much as four times greater
than claim payments on behalf of consumers. For all credit insurance coverages,
reverse competition has caused excessive commissions to lenders – commission
amounts that far exceed any reasonable costs incurred by the lenders in selling
the credit insurance on behalf of the credit insurer. In many cases, the lender
owns the credit insurer and realizes additional profits from very low loss
ratios.
Unfair Sales and Trade Practices
In
our view, the tremendous profit to producers from the sale of credit insurance
has led to numerous instances of unfair and deceptive sales practices by credit
insurers and producers over the years. Over the past several years, there have
been numerous enforcement actions and lawsuits against credit insurers and
lenders for unfair and deceptive sales practices. Credit insurers and lenders
have used coercive tactics to force consumers to purchase credit insurance
against their will and have deceived consumers into purchasing credit insurance
without their knowledge. In addition, many states allow credit insurers to
charge credit insurance premiums for amounts greater than the amount borrowed by
the consumer, causing consumers to pay excessive premiums.
Another problem found is post-claims
underwriting, when the credit insurance is sold to who are ineligible for
benefits. The lender sells the credit insurance policy, either knowing the
consumer is ineligible for benefits or not bothering to check. The credit
insurer is happy to take the premium from consumers ineligible for
benefits, but when the consumer files a claim, the credit insurer denies the
claim based on eligibility. The result of this arrangement is that creditors and
insurance companies keep the premiums paid by ineligible debtors who never file
an insurance claim, while refusing to pay on the same policies if claims are
ever filed.
General Recommendations for Reform
To
address the overpricing and unfair and deceptive practices that plague credit
insurance, we recommend that state legislators and insurance
regulators:
Additional Problems with Credit Property
Insurance
In addition to the problems generally for credit insurance,
credit property suffers from some specific problems, due to the fact that the
coverage is related to "property" and there is little regulation of the
product:
Excessive Premiums and Commissions and Very
Low Loss Ratios
While excessive commissions to producers are a
problem for all credit insurance coverages, as described above, the higher
commission levels for credit unemployment and credit property insurance are
particularly egregious. Commissions in 1997 exceeded 52% of premium for
credit unemployment and exceeded 45% for credit property insurance sold in
conjunction with credit cards. Commissions for credit unemployment and credit
property should be less than commissions for credit life and
disability.
In addition, minimum loss ratios credit property
and credit unemployment should be higher than the 60% target loss ratios for
credit life and credit disability. For example, if 60% is the minimum target
loss ratio for credit life and credit disability and that loss ratio reflects a
20% to 25% average commission, then a reduction in commission levels for credit
property and credit unemployment to a 5% to 10% average commission will alone
increase the minimum loss ratio target for credit unemployment and credit
property to 75%.
Recommendations for Credit Property
Insurance
There is a great deal of disparity in how the
states regulate credit property. While the NAIC has developed a model law and
regulation for credit life and disability, it has failed to adopt models for
credit property insurance. The states and the NAIC must step up to the plate and
enact effective regulation that protects consumers from excessive overcharging,
such as:
Conclusion
State legislatures and
state insurance regulators, with the assistance of the NAIC, must do a far
better job protecting credit insurance consumers than they have done to date.
The situation has worsened for credit insurance consumers as credit insurance
loss ratios have fallen and overcharges have grown. State regulation has
generally not protected credit insurance consumers for the traditional
coverages, even as new coverages are introduced that raise new consumer
concerns.
|
|
|||||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
($ Millions) |
Earned Premium | |
|
Louisiana |
21.2% |
40.7% |
11.4% |
22.6% |
26.4% |
$271.7 |
57.4% |
|
Mississippi |
29.3% |
36.0% |
12.6% |
23.2% |
29.4% |
$162.1 |
52.6% |
|
North Dakota |
30.8% |
32.9% |
12.8% |
38.7% |
29.0% |
$19.9 |
52.6% |
|
Alaska |
35.4% |
36.6% |
14.3% |
23.0% |
30.3% |
$16.2 |
50.9% |
|
Nevada |
43.2% |
32.6% |
11.7% |
26.4% |
31.2% |
$44.9 |
49.5% |
|
Nebraska |
30.8% |
38.6% |
7.9% |
21.5% |
31.1% |
$54.4 |
48.6% |
|
New Mexico |
29.0% |
43.7% |
12.0% |
38.2% |
32.6% |
$68.2 |
48.0% |
|
Minnesota |
39.9% |
29.3% |
11.3% |
13.4% |
31.9% |
$105.6 |
47.2% |
|
South Dakota |
37.4% |
31.4% |
7.1% |
16.4% |
32.2% |
$31.2 |
46.6% |
|
Utah |
37.3% |
38.1% |
10.6% |
27.5% |
32.9% |
$50.5 |
46.3% |
|
Arkansas |
33.4% |
48.0% |
10.2% |
33.8% |
33.4% |
$68.5 |
45.9% |
|
Montana |
34.0% |
39.5% |
17.2% |
31.6% |
33.8% |
$25.8 |
44.9% |
|
Kansas |
32.0% |
42.5% |
10.3% |
31.4% |
33.7% |
$81.4 |
44.7% |
|
Illinois |
39.9% |
38.5% |
15.5% |
22.4% |
34.6% |
$325.6 |
43.5% |
|
Colorado |
34.2% |
42.4% |
17.6% |
44.2% |
35.4% |
$86.7 |
42.5% |
|
Tennessee |
34.8% |
45.7% |
11.8% |
30.8% |
35.9% |
$245.9 |
41.8% |
|
Oklahoma |
37.9% |
43.3% |
13.0% |
34.8% |
36.0% |
$89.5 |
41.3% |
|
Georgia |
49.1% |
38.9% |
10.0% |
25.2% |
36.5% |
$274.5 |
40.9% |
|
Kentucky |
29.6% |
49.9% |
15.3% |
31.4% |
36.5% |
$157.8 |
40.5% |
|
Arizona |
49.6% |
38.1% |
10.1% |
22.5% |
36.9% |
$89.5 |
39.7% |
|
Iowa |
37.3% |
44.1% |
12.2% |
16.7% |
37.1% |
$69.6 |
38.8% |
|
Indiana |
33.2% |
47.7% |
8.7% |
24.3% |
37.1% |
$188.5 |
38.8% |
|
California |
52.4% |
47.4% |
18.5% |
32.0% |
38.9% |
$460.5 |
38.3% |
|
Dist Columbia |
61.7% |
45.2% |
13.3% |
25.9% |
39.0% |
$10.5 |
36.8% |
|
Wyoming |
43.7% |
45.2% |
11.6% |
39.0% |
38.7% |
$11.7 |
36.4% |
|
Idaho |
37.6% |
49.2% |
16.2% |
20.2% |
38.8% |
$29.8 |
36.3% |
|
Wisconsin |
40.4% |
46.0% |
12.8% |
31.1% |
39.2% |
$124.1 |
35.6% |
|
South Carolina |
35.6% |
57.1% |
15.4% |
35.4% |
40.5% |
$163.5 |
35.4% |
|
North Carolina |
35.1% |
49.3% |
12.5% |
39.0% |
40.1% |
$230.8 |
35.2% |
|
Maryland |
53.0% |
49.4% |
7.9% |
17.5% |
39.8% |
$107.8 |
34.6% |
|
Florida |
49.5% |
46.7% |
12.2% |
24.7% |
40.2% |
$345.4 |
34.5% |
|
Hawaii |
44.0% |
49.9% |
21.7% |
25.2% |
40.8% |
$25.2 |
34.0% |
|
Texas |
39.9% |
49.5% |
15.5% |
25.0% |
40.6% |
$385.4 |
33.6% |
|
Ohio |
41.3% |
49.3% |
15.7% |
23.3% |
41.0% |
$290.1 |
32.8% |
|
Massachusetts |
39.6% |
44.3% |
20.6% |
40.2% |
41.3% |
$50.0 |
32.5% |
|
Washington |
49.8% |
46.1% |
16.1% |
23.8% |
41.3% |
$121.8 |
32.5% |
|
Oregon |
51.6% |
43.2% |
18.3% |
21.2% |
41.3% |
$68.8 |
32.5% |
|
New Hampshire |
39.7% |
50.1% |
11.9% |
31.9% |
41.1% |
$20.6 |
32.4% |
|
Connecticut |
45.6% |
45.2% |
19.9% |
41.7% |
42.0% |
$36.7 |
31.8% |
|
Alabama |
37.7% |
51.9% |
14.3% |
48.0% |
42.1% |
$101.8 |
31.7% |
|
Delaware |
48.6% |
47.6% |
14.3% |
22.1% |
41.8% |
$20.8 |
31.6% |
|
Missouri |
48.8% |
43.0% |
16.8% |
29.8% |
42.1% |
$104.2 |
30.8% |
|
Virginia |
52.4% |
52.6% |
8.4% |
29.5% |
43.4% |
$130.6 |
29.2% |
|
Puerto Rico |
30.9% |
66.0% |
17.1% |
14.5% |
42.7% |
$85.9 |
28.8% |
|
Michigan |
43.2% |
55.0% |
12.8% |
28.3% |
45.4% |
$203.9 |
25.1% |
|
Rhode Island |
53.7% |
53.6% |
21.6% |
23.6% |
46.8% |
$11.4 |
23.6% |
|
West Virginia |
33.9% |
74.8% |
20.8% |
31.8% |
47.9% |
$42.1 |
21.9% |
|
New Jersey |
53.4% |
70.0% |
16.4% |
28.7% |
49.7% |
$72.6 |
19.0% |
|
Vermont |
48.5% |
62.1% |
15.3% |
15.4% |
54.0% |
$2.5 |
10.3% |
|
Pennsylvania |
54.8% |
67.6% |
43.0% |
42.5% |
60.1% |
$7.7 |
1.1% |
|
Maine |
64.6% |
69.8% |
15.7% |
48.1% |
64.7% |
-$4.3 |
-7.1% |
|
New York |
74.9% |
75.5% |
33.8% |
31.6% |
69.3% |
-$69.9 |
-14.0% |
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